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DIVERSITY AND PERFORMANCE: 
THE ELUSIVE LINKAGE 
Abstract 
Previous studies o.f the relationships between diversification and perfor-
.. m;:rnce·, ·" al-rnougn: ·valuab~e; have f<rcusea on "achieve-a·-performance .. a:n:a -not on 
how .to improve performance. Furthermore, there is as yet no overall theory 
that links divE!rsity and _performance. The purpose of this paper is to propose 
a crucial linkage and to show how this linkage can add significantly to our 
understanding of performance in the diversified firm. 
For the past thirty-five years product-mark.et diversification of large 
firms has continued at a rapid pace. Today, over two-thirds of the firms in 
the U.S.A.- Fortupe 500 are highly diversified and similar patterns of diversi-
fication exist in Weste;n Europe and Japan (Rumelt 1974, Pavan 1972, 
Thanheiser 1972, Pooley 1972, Channon 1977, Suzuki 1980). As a consequence, 
interest: in _ the relationship between corporate diversification and financial 
perform.Snee has grown am~ng practitioners, academics, and public policy mak-
ers. 
Accompanying this interest has been a spate of research on the patterns 
of diversification -and the determinants of performance in diversified firms 
by the acade.mic community. Concurrently, consulting firms have been actively 
promoting a varie,ty of approaches for managing diversified firms. The ·results 
of these efforts have been. mixed at best. There is, as yet, no overall theory 
that links diversification with J)erformance and the linkage, if any, remains 
elusive. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a crucial linkage, which has 
largely· been ignored_ in the literature on the relationship between diversifi-
cation· and · performance; and to show how this approach can add significantly to 
our managerial understanding in the diversified firm. 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON DIVERSITY AND PERFORMANCE 
The purpose of· this section is to review briefly the major academic re-
search· stTeams; and· consulting frameworks relevant to the relationships between 
diversity and performance. Those readers unfamiliar with the area in general 
or interested .in learning more about any specific topic shoultl consult the re-
ferences listed.-. While significant literature exists in support of each of 
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the streams of research outlined below, we will only reference and discuss the 
seminal works in each area. 
The Strat~gY of Diversification 
Pioneering work by Chandler {1962) and Ansoff (1965) established the mo-
tivations for diversification and the general nature of the diversified firm. 
Wrigley (1970) refined and extended Chandler's study by investigating the va-
rious options open to a diversifying firm. For example, a firm might expand 
into new areas linking technological or market charactistics of the new · busi-
ness to current activities, or, alternatively, it might diversify without re-
gard to such relationships. Building on the work of Chandler, Wrigley, and 
others, Rumelt (1974,- 1977) investigated the relationships among diversifica-
tion strategy, organizational structure, and economic performance. His- stu-
_4ie~; were based on a random sample of 246 firms drawn from the Fortune 500 
during the period from 1949 through 1974. Rumelt used four major and nine mi-
nor categories to characterize the diversification strategy of firms. The ma~ 
jor categories were single business, dominant business, related business and 
unrelated business. These categories provide a spectrum of diversification 
strategies from firms that remain essentially undiversified to -firms that di-
versified significantly into unrelated areas. Using statistical methods, 
Rumelt was able to relate diversification strategy to performance. The re-
lated diversification strategies related-constrained and related-linked 
(e.g., General Foods and General Electric) were f-ound to outperform the other 
diversification strategies on the average. The related-constrained was found 
to be the highest performing on the average. (In related-constrained firms 
most component businesses are related to each other, whereas in related-linked 
firms only one-to-one relationships are required.) By contrast, the unrelated 
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conglomerate strategy was found to be one of the lowest performing on the 
average. 
Recently Nathanson and Cassano (1982) conducted a statistical study of 
diversity and performance using a sample of 206 firms over the years 1973-
1978. They developed a· two-dimensional typology for capturing diversification 
strategy that refines R.umelt 's categories. On one dimension they measured 
lllarket diversity and on the other dimension they measured product diversity. 
They found that returns (on the average) declined as product diversity in-
ereased while returns remained relatively steady as market diversity in-
creased. However, they also found that size plays an important ·moderating 
role on the relationships. For both the market and product diversity, smaller 
firms did . well relative to larger firms in categories marked by no dive_rsiU-
cation and in categories of extremely high diversification. Larger firms . did 
significantly better than smaller firms i1l the in-between categories - those 
characterized by i .ntermediate levels of diversification. 
In both these studies linking diversification and performance (R.umelt and 
Nathanson/Cassano) the· key point to note. is that choosing the generic strategy 
of diver.sifieation . (how much and what kind of relatedness) is key to achieving 
performance. 
Economic Characteristics of Individual Businesses 
Few: would argue that the characteristics of the various industries in 
which a firm participates and the position. of the firm's businesses in these 
industries impacts overall firm performance. For an interesting and readable 
conceptual discussion of the influence of industry structure on performance 
see Porter (1980). 
Two studies. have in fact empirically validated these influences for di-
versified firms. The widely discussed PIMS program of the Marketing Science 
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Institute (see Schoeffler, Buzzell, and Heany, 1974, for an introduction) has 
shown that variables such as market share and relative product quality direct-
ly influence the profitability of constituent businesses in large diversified 
firms. More recently, Montgomery (1979) has examined the performance differ-
ences in diversified ffrms using the market structure variables of industrial 
organization economics. Montgomery found that diversified firms with higher 
levels of performance tended to have well positioned businesses in industries 
with "favorable" Dlarket structures. Specifically, she found that a diversi-
fied firm's profitability depended on the average concentration and profit-
ability of the industries in which it participated and the firmis average mar-
ket share Within these industries. 
In summary, for both studies (PIMS and Montgomery) the structure of the 
industries . in which the firm competes and the competitive position of the 
firm's businesses within these industries are the key determinants of perform-
ance. 
Portfolio CQ.ncePts 
What are hete called "portfolio concepts" go by various names such as 
portfolio grids, SBU concepts, and SBU matrices. The origin of these ap-
proaches is usually traced to the Boston Consulting Group, General Electric 
Company, and McKinsey and Company. Although there are numerous slight varia-
tions among the approaches used by various consultant groups and firms, they 
all rely on a matrix or grid with two axes. The matrix classifies businesses 
by product-market attractiveness, or some variant of it, along one axis and by 
competitive position or some variant of it along the other axis. Typically 
these matrices are divided into either four or nine boxes. (For a thorough 
discussion see Hofer and Schendel, 1978.) The position (box) that each busi-
ness occupies represents its strategic position and determines the role that 
5 
the business should play in the corporate portfolio. This role involves vary-
ing degrees of cash generation or cash usage. Studies by Bettis (1979), and 
Haspeslagh (1982) suggest that managers use these concepts to varying degrees 
as a tool to a dogma -- in managing a diversified portfolio of businesses. 
For each variant o'f the portfolio concept the key points are: (1) the 
strategic position of each business determines its desired cash flow charac-
teristic~; and (2) it is the "balance" of these cash flow characteristics that 
leads to overall performance of the . diversified firm. 
The Human Relations School 
In addition t .o the streams of research discussed above, a number of .stu-
dies focusing on performance in large firms by researchers concerned with or-
ganizational theory and human motivation, have appeared recently. These stu-
dies do not consider the problem of diversity as it affects performance in the 
large organization. Representative of' this line of research these are Peters 
and Waterman (1982), Deal and Kennedy (1982), Pascale and Athos (1981) and 
Ouchi (1981). These studies often draw directly or indirectly on some of the 
approaches that are believed to have been significant in the development of 
successful Japanese firms. In all of these studies there is a great .deal of 
emphasis on achieving a high and · sustainable level of motivation among the en-
tire management team and work force. 
The four streams of research lead to somewhat different conclusions. To 
summarize, the linkage between diversity and performance would appear to be a 
function of: 
Summao/ 
1. The generic diversification strategy adopted by the firm, or 
2.. the quality of the individual businesses, as measured by the 
competitive structure of the industry and the strength of 
that firm in that industry, or 
3. the cash flow characteristics of the various businesses 
and the internal cash flow balance for the total firm, or 
4. the corporate ·culture and the level of motivation of the 
employees - the desire for excellence. 
Undoubtedly, all the four perspectives provide partial answers to the ques-
tion. The difficulty in using the results of the research streams outlined 
above arises from the following: 
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1. They focus attention on and document characteristics associated with 
'achieved' performance, not on how to 'improve performance'. In 
other words, it is a static view. 
2. They do not deal with the problems of 'how to diversify', but only 
on performance given a pattern of diversification. 
3. They focus on performance measures like ROC, ROE, or cash flow, one 
at a time but not on performance of the business as a whole (includ-· 
ing factors such as technology and product leadership, good community 
and government relations, people management, etc.). While we are 
very cognizant of the intractability of some of these performance 
measures and the difficulties in including them in a meaningful re-
search design, we should however, recognize their managerial impor-
tance. 
The Importance of "Quality of Management": 
Bettis, Hall and Prahalad (1979) have argued that, if we moved away from 
the traditional research preoccupation with central tendencies, but focus on 
outliers - the very high and very poor performers - we may learn more about 
the elusive linkage between diversity and performance. {Peters and Waterman, 
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1982, represent this type of study. Unfortunately they did not explicitly 
address the problem of diversity nor couple the study of high performers with 
a study of low performers.) By studying just twelve firms, six of which were 
high performers and six low performers, across the three generic categories of 
dominant, related, and unrelated diversifiers (with a sample of four firms 
each, two in high and two in low performance categories), they concluded that 
the quality of management was as critical in explaining performance as any 
other factor. The study was not based on the large sample (and it could not 
be by design, as their concern was with outliers), and the conclusions were 
tentative. The real departure in the academic perspective on diversity and 
performance indicated by the study was the concern with very good and very 
poor performances in the same generic diversification category and the _inclu-
sion of importance of the quality of management as a major variable linking 
diversity and performance. 
Two other studies indicate the importance of the quality of management in 
managing diversification. Ranjan Das (1981) studied one firm's attempt to di-
versify out of the core business (tobacco) and how it had to learn the process 
of general management in the new businesses into which it ventured. The con-
clusion was that it was not the quality of the businesses -- its competitive 
structure - or the pattern of diversification per se that determined early 
failures and success later, but the evolution of the top management and its 
ability to acquire new skills and recognize that its approach to managing a 
diversified firm must be different from the way it had managed the single 
business firm. The study by Miles (1982) of tobacco companies in the US and 
their attempts to diversify away from tobacco, also leads to a similar conclu-
sion. The firms had to learn as much about general management in the 
diversified firm, as a distinct process and skill, as the characteristics of 
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the new businesses. Both these studies indicate that the work of top manage-
ment in diversified firms is a distinct skill and can contribute to the suc-
cess or failure of anyone of the businesses within the firm or the firm as a 
whole. 
The Management of a Diversified Firm 
Studies of the work of top management and the process by which they man-
age a diversified firm are not numerous. Bower (1972) demonstrated that top 
managers influence the strategic choices made by unit level managers by or-
chestrating the organizational context - the formal structure and systems. 
In other words, the tools of top management were administrative in character. 
Hammermesh (1977) outlined the process by which top managers intervene in a 
divisional profit crisis. Prahalad and Doz (1981) outlined, in detail,· hoW 
top managers can use administrative tools to shift the strategic direction of 
a business. This line of research established both the broad scope of the 
work of top management, but more importantly on how that influences the stra-
tegic choices made by lower level managers at the business unit level, thereby 
impacting on the overall performance. There exists a logical, though not cur-
rently empirically verified link between the quality of management and the 
performance of the firm. 
The two questions that we posed ourselves based on the literature were: 
1. If top managers in single business firms had to learn the process of 
managing a diversified portfolio, should top managers in diversified 
firms go through a similar learning process when they add new busi-
nesses? Is the task of top management in the diversified firm de-
pendent on or at least partially influenced by the underlying stra-
tegic characteristcs of the businesses? 
-------------------------- --- --
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2. If the tools available to top managers in diversified firms to influ-
ence the strategic direction of businesses are essentially admini-
strative as it affects the organizational context, does it follow 
that the substance of businesses are irrelevant? In other words, can 
the same context management capabilities suffice if the mix of busi-
nesses change? 
These questions are motivated by the fact that current models that link 
diversity and performance do not shed light on issues like i) why do some 'ob-
vious winners' fail?, ii) why do some 'obvious losers' succeed?, iii) what, 
if any, are the limits to the management of diversity?, and iv) how does an 
organization learn to cope with diversity? 
We will provide some examples that illustrate the dilemmas faced by 
practi.tioners and researchers concerned with the diversity-performance link-
age. 
Examp.l~s of . 'Obvious . Wi,nrters' . Losing 
- Johnson and Johnson, with a diversified portfolio of drugs, 
toiletries, hygienic products, baby care products, and industri-
al products entered the disposable diaper business during 1973. 
The company was totally identified with baby care, and had an 
enviable distribution capability. However, by 1981, it exited 
the business, unable to sustain itself in the disposable diaper 
business • . (Source: Johnson and Johnson Annual Reports, 1973, 
1981.) 
Texas Instruments (TI), a leader in semiconductors, entered 
the digital watch business during 1975. The aggressive price 
cutting strategy followed by TI convinced several observers 
(Business Week, 1975) that TI would bring leadership in watches 
back to the US. However, it exited the business in 1980. 
(Source: Business Week, October 27, 1975.) 
- Philip Morris, known as an aggressive marketer, acquired 7-Up 
during 1978. lt paid, as it did with Miller Brewing, what was 
considered a high price ($515 million, which was 20 times earn-
ings). As of 1982, 7-Up had lost its market share from 6. 6% in 
1975 to S.O% by 1982, in spite of the fact that Philip Morris had 
spent, by published accounts, at least $60 million. However, 
Miller Brewing was considered a spectacular marketing (if not a 
financial) achievement. Market share increased from 4.5% in 
1971 to 21% in 1982. (Source: Mergers & Acquisitions, Fall 
1978.) 
- EMI, a British firm with a firm base in entertainment and de-
fense electronics, was the first to develop a CT scanner during 
1970. It was an instant success. By 1975-76, it was a world 
leader and had more than 70% market share in the US. Almost 40% 
of all radiological research papers presented at conferences in 
the US were based on EMI's CT scanner. However, by 1980, the 
firm had to exit the business. It was unable to exploit the ex-
cellent market position it enjoyed. 
- American Can purchased Pickwick International, a firm involved 
in distributing records. Pickwick was a leader, the second lar-
gest in the US with a very profitable history. When it was ac-
quired in 1977, for $101.6 million, as part of American Can's 
strategy for moving into consumer businesses, it was very prof-
itable. Within two years, there was significant profit and mar-
ket snare decline. (Source: Mergers and Acquisitions, Fall, 
1977.) 
- Hueblein, a very successful liquor marketer, acquired Hamm 
Brewerie.s, during 1965, for $62 million. In spite of the 
extraordinary success of Heublein, Hamm was very unsuccessful. 
Hamm was divested for $6-10 million, during 1973. Similarly, 
Heublein's acquisition of Kentucky Fried Chicken and Stouffers 
frozen foods, have not been spectacular successes. (Source: 
Heublein Case, 1966.) · 
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These examples include diversification through internal development and 
acquisition, situations where technology or marketing synergy or both existed. 
The acquired businesses had very attractive market positions, and the acquir-
ing firms were well known for the quality of management, as evidenced by their 
' 
success prior to these acquisitions. Now to some counter examples ••• 
Examples of Obvious Losers' Winning 
,- General Electric ventured into fina.ncial services businesses 
in a big way, away from customer credit to industrial leasing. 
It was a totally "unrelated" activity - by our current defini-
tions of relatedness. However, the financial services business 
has become one of the fastest growing and most profitable of 
GE's businesses. As of 1982, GE credit accounted for 7.3% of GE 
sales and 11.3% of GE profit. (Source: GE 1982 Annual Report.) 
- Rolm, a small manufacturer of defense computers, branched off 
into PBX market during 1973. At that time Rolm's sales were 
$3.6 million. It challenged AT&T (AT&T·'s market share of PBX 
was conservatively 12.5%), GTE and other such firms several times 
it~; size. By 1980, Rolm had gained 80% of PBX market share and 
was considered a leader. (Source: Rolm Corp., Stanford Busi-
ness Case, 1979.) 
- Honda, a fi .rm with annual sales of a small fraction of General 
Motors, with primarily a position in motorcycles, entered the 
fiercely competitive auto-market, first in Japan in 1962 and in 
the US during 1971·. While by all standards the auto-market was 
a (a) low growth, (b) capital intensive, (c) concentrated 
(dominated by GM and Ford), and (d) technology intensive, Honda 
was able to establish a secure and profitable position and even 
initiate US production by 1982. 
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We could enlarge the number of examples. Here are examples that, by ex-
!sting theory, should have failed. Either they represented unrelated divers!-
fication, or the parent was cash starved, or the firm had to contend with a 
very unfavorable market structure. While these examples do not disprove ex-
!sting wisdom, it certainly raises doubts on the adequacy of our models. 
THE ELUSIVE LINKAGE 
Based on our exploratory research, we find that most top managements op-
erate with a single or a s.et of dominant . general management logic(s) A 
dominant logic is the way management conceptualizes the business and makes de-
cisions. In essence, it is the mindset and repertoire of tools that top man-
agement uses to identify, define, and make strategic decisions. These tasks 
of general management relate to resource allocation, control over operations, 
the ability to detect impending crisis or emerging potential, and the ability 
to intervene in a particular business to resolve a crisis. The tasks are per-
formed by the use of administrative tools like planning, budgeting, rewards 
and punishment, career management, organization structure changes, etc. The 
dominant logic evolves because (see Exhibit 1) the traditional or largest 
business (i.e., the "core" business) tends to dominate the thinking and ac-
tions of top management. Top managers focus their energies on the tasks that 
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are critical for success given the characteristics of the core business. This 
in turn causes them to see problems in certain ways and to develop familiarity 
with and facility in the use of those tools that are particularly useful in 
accomplishing the critical tasks of the core business. In other words, the 
tasks critical for success in the core business tends to establish top manage ... 
'lilent 's minds~t and repertoire of . tools. This mindset and repertoire of tools 
then furthers a focusing effect on those particular characteristics of the 
core business that define the critical tasks for success. Often, top managers 
confronted with wide differences in the demands of businesses tend to group 
them, under a group or sector management, based on strategic similarities 
among the businesses so grouped. The examples of General Electric Company 
and Textron, indicate that the dominant logics required of businesses w:f.thin a 
sector or a group tend to be similar. They may be quite dissimilar across 
sectors. In other words, ~bile the dominant logics across businesses may be 
quite varied, firms like GE effectively reduce the variety by grouping similar 
businesses together, thus limiting, for all practical purposes, the variety at 
the top management level. Further, strategic direction of specific businesses 
tend to be managed at the sector level, which represents a collection of busi ... 
ness with similar strategic logics. 
The need to change the dominant logic may arise from two distinct forces: 
the acquisition or development of a new business with a different dominant 
logic or the rapid changes in the structure of the core business (see Exhibit 
2). This paper focuses primarily on the first of these forces - addition of 
new businesses. However, much of the argument is equally applicable to rapid 
changes in the structure of the core business. Interestingly, the authors 
believe that because of the rapid pace of change in the competitive milieu 
(e.g., technological ad'17ance, globalization, and increasing government 
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intervention in many countries) many large companies are currently forced t .o 
cope with changes in dominant logics. Consider, for example, General Motors 
and the US auto industry. With dramatic structural changes occurring in the 
auto industry, (globalization, market share shifts, emergence of stringent 
regulations on emmissions, safety, fleet mileage requirements, and joint ven-
tures), the mindsets required to manage the firm tend to be quite different 
from those which led to success during the 60's and early 70's. 
In the case o.f US Steel, the firm has to cope not only with the dramatic 
shifts taking place in the steel industry worldwide, but at the same time cope 
with the need to integrate Marathon Oil, an acquisition outside its core busi-
ness, and a business with entirely different industry characteristics and 
strategic itDperativ:es. Moreover, the oil industry was also undergoing struc-
tural change as of 1981 .... 1982. US Steel had to, therefore not only cope with 
the new dominant logic forced by changes in the steel industry, but at the 
same time understand and cope with those imposed by its acquisition of Mara-
thon Oil. 
When a t .op management acquires or internally develops a new business, the 
dominant logic required of that business may correspond with the logic of the 
existing businesses. Some firms operate with a single dominant logic (e.g., 
Gener~l Motors) and some others with multiple dominant logics (e.g., General 
Electric). If the new business does not correspond to the existing dominant 
logic(s) of the firm, a new logic has to be developed, i.e., the top manage-
ment has to create an organizational and administrative · basis for learning the 
unique needs of that business and ensuring that it will not be sub.1ect to the 
same logic that may have worked in existing businesses. In other words, top 
managers must ask themselves, in addition to the financial, technological and 
marketing "fits" of the new business, whether it fits the dominant logic(s) 
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currently used by them. This need for identifying and classifying businesses 
is captured in exhibit 3. If the new business falls in cell (A) then there is 
no need to reexamine the processes of management within the firm. However, if 
it does not, and falls into cell (B), then, top managers will have to estab-
lish a differentiated basis for dealing with that business. IBM, for example, 
created an independent business unit (IBU) to handle the Personal Computer 
business and even geographically separated it. However, once top managers 
felt that it had taken root, they moved it back into the mainline of IBM's 
business. 
If the business falls in cell (C), then the task of top managers is to 
identify and group that business with other businesses, within the firm, using 
similar strategic logic. This will be the equivalent, in General Electric or 
3M of assigning it to a sector. However, if it falls into cell (D), then, it 
may merit the same separate treatment as in cell (B). 
The Importance of Key Individuals: 
Implicit in our discussion of dominant logic so far is the role of top 
management. We view top management not as a "faceless abstraction" but as a 
collection of key individuals. The mindsets, the repertoire of skills, the 
ability to read and adapt to weak signals, the determinants of the dominant 
logic(s), an organization is capable of, is in essence the variety that key 
individuals (and a coalition of individuals) can cope with in a large organi-
zation. There is a significant body of research in psy~hology and artificial 
intelligence that we can draw on to understand how an individual's capabili-
ties to solve complex problems are developed. 
We have categorized the streams of research into two groups - the pro-
cesses by which reinforcement of a world view takes place and the processes of 
complex problem solving. The framework used is shown in exhibit 4. We will 
briefly examine the various streams of research to explicitly deal with the 
sources of dominant logic used by a top manager. 
The S.ources of Dominant Logic 
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We identified four streams of research - operant conditioning, paradigms, 
cognitive biases, and artificial intelligence - that collect! vely may help us 
understand the various facets of dominant logic and how top managers can ex-
pand their repertoire of skills. 
Skinner (1953) in his seminal work on operant conditioning, argued that 
behavior was a function of its consequences. Behavior could be understood by 
considering the contingencies that were administered by the environment in re-
sponse to certain behaviors. Behavior that was reinforced was emitted more 
frequently in the future. By contrast, behavior that was ignored or punished 
(negative reinforcement) was likely to diminish over time. A dominant logic 
can be seen as resulting from the reinforcement that results from doing the 
"right things" with respect to a business. In other words, when top managers 
effectively perform the tasks that are critical for success in the core busi-
ness they are positively reinforced by economic success. This reinforcement 
results in their focusing effort on the behaviors that led to success. Hence, 
they develop. a particular mindset and repertoire of tools. This in turn de-
termines the approaches that will be taken to resource allocation, the detec-
tion of impending crisis or emerging opportunity,. control over operations, and 
the approach to intervention in case of crisis or unexploited opportunity. 
Consider what happens, however, if the firm acquires or develops a business 
for which the critical tasks for success are substantially different from 
those in . the core business. Here, because of operant conditioning the emitted 
behaviors are likely to remain those that are appropriate for the core busi-
ness even though they may be inappropriate in the new business. In other 
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words, it will be difficult for a top management group to be effective when a 
new dominant logic is required. The problems faced by American Can and Exxon 
in managing acquisitions of businesses totally different from their core busi-
nesses, in the early stages, is an illustration of the power of operant condi-
tioning on top management. 
The concept of dominant logic also derives direct support from Kuhn's 
(1970) work on scientific paradigms and Allison's (1971) work on the impor-
tance of alternate paradigms in the context of analyzing government actions 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Kuhn, a historian of science, argued that a particular science at any 
point in time can be characterized by a set of" shared beliefs" or "conven-
tional wisdom" about the world that constitutes what he called the "dominant 
paradigm." What 'Kuhn calls "norrilal science" is carried out efficiently under 
this set of shared beliefs. In a sense, Kuhn's "paradigm" is simply a way of 
defining and managing the world and a· basis for action in that world. It 
specifies what is a legitimate part of the science and what are legitimate ap-
proaches to doing science. Kuhn points out how difficult it is to shift domi-
nant paradigms and illustrates this with several examples such as the shift 
from the Ptolemaic view of the universe (earth centered) to the Copernican 
view of the universe (sun centered) in astronomy. The analogy from science to 
a business firm is simple and direct. The dominant paradigm and the dominant 
logic are conceptually similar but employed in different fields. 
Allison used paradigmatic analysis to show how the'adoption of a particu-
lar paradigm powerfully effects our evaluation of events. He characterized a 
paradigm as ·~a systematic statement of the basic assumptions, concepts and 
propositions employed by a school of analysis." Different paradigms resulted 
in dramatically different analyses of his chosen example: the Cuban missile 
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crisis. The parallel between Allison's use of the word paradigm and our use 
of dominant logic is obvious. 
As part of the development of "intelligent" computer programs there have 
been numerous efforts to develop chess playing programs. (See Newell and 
Simon, 1972, for a review.) Inevitably such research has required intense 
studies of how chess experts mnake decisions in a chess game. In particular, 
the decision making and problem solving of grandmasters and masters has been 
compared to that of lesser player (de Groot, 1965). These studies have ehown 
that the better players could remember more "patterns" of previous games than 
the lesser players. Simon, (1979) estimated that class A players could remem-
ber about 1300 familiar patterns while masters or grandmasters remember about 
50,000. This "vocabulary" of previous games lets players make effective de-
cisions by comparison with earlier games. In other words, chess players de-
cide on the basis of experience or "what worked before," not on the basis of 
some best strategy or optimizing procedure. Now consider a situation where 
the design of the gameboard or rules of chess are changed. The stored "vocab-
ulary" of games is no longer as useful in this new game. Similarly, when the 
economic game board or rules are changed by a diversification move, the 
vocabulary of economic moves stored through experience in the core business is 
no longer as useful. In other words, solutions based ·on "past experience" or 
solution by "analogy" may be inappropriate. 
A final area · from which research results are suggestive of the concept of 
a dominant top management logic is cognitive psychology; The psychology of 
cognitive biases is the study of how people in making decisions sometimes make 
systematic (and often severe) errors (See Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, for an 
introduction and survey). When dealing with uncertain and complex tasks 
people often rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which greatly 
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simplify the decision process. In general, these heuristics are useful, but 
on some occasions they can result in significant errors. 
For present purposes the most interesting of these heuristic principles 
is what is called the availability heuristic. (See Tversky and Kahneman, 
1973, for a thorough discussion.) Basically, the availability heuristic leads 
people to make decisions by using information that can easily be brought to 
mind (i.e., information that is "available"). This often leads to severe and 
systematic errors. This field of research also suggests that decision makers 
do not necessarily use analytical approaches to evaluate the information con-
tent of available data or search for "adequate information" (Nisbett and Ross, 
1980). For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) point out that one may assess 
the risk of heart attack among middle~aged people by recalling such occur-
rences among one's acquaintances even if it can he shown that it is an inap-
propriate basis for drawing such a conclusion. Obviously, for top managers, 
knowledge of the core business and the business they are most familiar with 
will be a significant source of available information. They tend to apply it 
to other businesses where it may or may not be appropriate (Das, 1981). Re-
search on cognitive processes suggests that the mindset and repertoire of 
tools that constitute the dominant logic are likely to be inappropriately ap-
plied by managers confronted with a "different" business and that there is 
significant "learning" that precedes change in those biases. The difficulty 
of operating in diverse businesses which require multiple dominant logics is 
obvious. 
We have so far argued that a key determinant of successful diversifica-
tion be it through acquisition or internal development -- is the fit be~ 
tween the dominant logic that the new business demands and the logic(s) that 
the top management of a diversifying firm is capable of. In other words, 
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central to our view of the determinants of high performance in a diversified 
firm, are the following ideas: 
i) the ability of a top management group to accept the need for 
grouping businesses based on strategic similarities (as dis-
tinct from technical or market similarities) and create the 
capabilities to manage them differently. 
ii) The recognition that a dominant coalition of top managers 
influence the dominant logic(s) of the organization. This 
implies that the capabilities of a firm to cope with diver-
sity may be restricted or enhanced by the quality of the top 
management team. The composition of that team may be criti-
cal. 
iii) 'the recognition of the importance of key individuals. As an 
indiVidual, the variety of dominant logic(s) that a manager 
is capable of is a function of his past experiences (i.e., 
the number and patterns of moves he can recognize), as well 
as his career path to top management and the reasons he per-
ceives for his success (i.e., operant conditioning). While 
these two factors determine the range of logics he can cope 
with, dependence on conventional wisdom (i.e., paradigms) in 
contrast to the ability to use varied analytical approaches 
and ability to tap a wide variety of sources of data to cope 
with substantive and organizational problems (i.e. , cogni-
ti ve biases) may lind t his ability to expand his skills. 
The implication is that the more varied the backgrounds of 
top managers, less are the chances that they will depend on 
a singly dominant logic. Further, the greater the desire of 
key managers to expose themselves to new sources of data as 
well as new analytical approaches (a learning orientatio.n), 
less is· the danger of a single dominant logic being applied 
across dissimilar businesses. 
The composition of the top management team and how it copes with diversity, 
we believe, is an important determinant of performance. Top managers can re-
strict diversity by opting out of some opportunities in the interest of a 
focus" or expand their skills and capabilities to accommodate a "wider vari-
ety." 
CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of dominant strategic logic and the role of top managers in 
understanding and managing the logic(s), are important aspec~s to be 
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considered in the research on diversity and performance. There are several 
implications of including the concept of dominant strategic logic in the study 
of diversity and performance. We will list some: 
1. Limits to Diversity: 
We have argued that the "real diversity" in a firm does not arise 
from the variety in technologies or markets per se but from the strategic 
demands the businesses impose on top management or the variety in domi-
nant logics. Further, the variety of dom1nant logics that a top man&ge-
nent can handle depends on the composition of the team, their experiences, 
as well as their attitude toward learning. These factors suggest that we 
ought to recognize that the limit to the diversity of businesses within a 
firm is determined by the strategic variety and that the strategic ·variety 
that a firm can cope with is dependent on the composition of a top manage-
ment team. In other words, each top management team, at a given point in 
time, has an inbuilt limit to the extent of diversity. 
2. Diversity and Performance: 
A high level of performance in a diversified firm requires the abil-
ity to "respond fast'' to competitor moves as well as "respond appropriate-
ly." One of the itttplications of our thesis so far, is that top managers 
are less likely to "respond appropriately" to situations where the domi-
nant logic is different as well as not respond quickly enough as they may 
be unable to interpret the meaning of information regarding unfamiliar 
businesses. The "hidden costs" associated with diversifying into nonfa-
miliar businesses is shown schematically in exhibit 5. These "hidden 
costs" are not explicitly recognized when the overall business climate is 
very favorable. The problems surface when the newly acquired businesses 
(which are stra;tegically dissimilar) encount.er competitive problems or are 
faced with a profit crisis. Top managers find themselves unable to re-
spond to the crisis (Hammermesh, 1977). 
3. I'm?roving Performance in Diversified Firms: 
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The prescription for improving -performance in diversified firms fol-
lows two distinct routes. One, top managers may have to reduce the stra-
tegic variety in the businesses within the firm -- what has come to be 
known as "focus" in the portfolio. Secondly, top managers may attempt to 
enhance their skills and enlarge the range of dominant strategic logic(s) 
they are capable of coping with. This process raises questions such as 
"how fast" and "by what ~ans." 
4. The Meatd.ng ()f "Relatedness:" 
The concept of related or conglomerate diversification was typically 
based on an analysis of the technological and market characteristics. The 
view presented here suggests that we may have to -develop a concept of re-
latedne~s based on the "strategic similarities" of businesses coupled with 
the unique capacities associated with a specific top management team, to 
manage a variety of dominant logic(s). This view of "relatedness" is not 
totally independent of the top management team in a diversified firm. 
The relationship between diversity and performance remains elusive. Ex-
plicitly recognizing and incorporating the concepts developed in this paper, 
may help our understanding of this linkage. 
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